The fight for the so-called “socle commun” – the common political foundation of the center and the moderate right – is now officially open. With the designation of Gabriel Attal as the preferred Renaissance candidate for the 2027 presidential elections, French politics enters a phase of permanent primaries. Three men are now trying to embody the same political promise: to prevent a new final duel between the Rassemblement National and the far left.
The problem is that Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe, and Bruno Retailleau largely appeal to the same electorate, but follow fundamentally different strategies.
For months Édouard Philippe has been trying to establish a classic presidential demeanor: distance as a statesman, sparse public appearances, international seriousness, and the image of political stability. He wants to appear as the man capable of restoring calm and order after the years of Macronist fragmentation.
Gabriel Attal, on the other hand, pursues exactly the opposite strategy. Constant media presence, ongoing travels throughout the country, offensive statements and a distinctly more nervous political rhetoric: the former prime minister relies on pace, visibility, and the generational embodiment of a new political style.
Bruno Retailleau, in turn, tries to rebuild a right oriented toward authority, to win back conservative voters who are increasingly sympathetic to Jordan Bardella, without directly switching to the Rassemblement National.
Behind this personal competition, however, lies a much more fundamental question: does this famous “common base” still exist?
This alliance was born from the gradual rapprochement between the political center of Macronism and parts of the Republican right after the crisis years of 2024. Initially, this alignment appeared primarily as a pragmatic governing coalition to ensure parliamentary majorities. Today it increasingly seems like a political space lacking a clear ideological axis.
The paradox is evident. All the protagonists publicly emphasize the need for unity and warn against the fragmentation of the moderate camp. At the same time, however, each has long been building their own presidential machine. Debates about possible open primaries make this contrast particularly visible: no one really seems willing to stand behind a rival.
Gabriel Attal certainly has qualities that some of his competitors partly lack. At 37 years old, he almost perfectly masters the modern mechanisms of political communication. In particular, among urban and academically educated voters, he continues to have high visibility and mobilization capacity.
And this is precisely where his weakness lies. His political identity remains closely tied to the declining Macronism – and therefore to a political phase that many French now associate with institutional instability, reform fatigue, and wear and tear of power.
Édouard Philippe instead benefits from a decidedly more presidential image in the polls. However, his cautious strategy also carries risks. Political caution can, in an increasingly polarized public opinion, quickly be perceived as mere opportunism or political passivity.
Bruno Retailleau, with his distinctly conservative right-wing stance, manages to build a stable militant base within the Republicans. At the same time, however, this ideological sharpness hinders his ability to attract centrist voters and to form a broader alliance.
The real challenge for this centrist and conservative camp might lie elsewhere. While the moderate forces get lost in internal rivalries, Jordan Bardella and the political extremes benefit from a much clearer political legibility. An increasing part of the public opinion now seems to prefer simple and easily recognizable political lines over large ideologically blurred coalitions.
The 2027 presidential elections could therefore be less a dispute over programs and more a competition over political embodiment and leadership style. And it is precisely in this contest that the «socle commun» risks losing its true political center.
Author: P. Tiko