The phrase seems casual, almost colloquial. “Il ne faut pas emmerder les Français” — one must not burden the French any more. It was pronounced by Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu when presenting new aid against rising energy prices as a consequence of the escalation in the Middle East. But precisely in its demonstrative simplicity, this phrase reveals a notable political shift in France.
Because Paris is visibly beginning to prepare the population not for a temporary crisis, but for a permanent state of exception.
The French government now speaks with a sobriety about geopolitical risks that would have been unusual just a few years ago. Lecornu openly declared that the conflict in the Middle East will continue “one way or another.” Even under favorable conditions, some stabilization of the situation is expected by autumn. At the same time, the government warns about scenarios that until now were discussed more in security think tanks: attacks on oil infrastructures, disruptions in maritime trade routes, possible blockades of the Strait of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab.
With this, the political tone in France changes fundamentally. The government no longer tries to rhetorically hide uncertainty. It increasingly integrates it into state communication.
The new language of the permanent crisis
The true meaning of Lecornu’s phrase therefore lies less in the content than in the political nuance.
“Do not disturb the French” in this context does not only mean social consideration. It is the implicit recognition of a political vulnerability: the French state knows how quickly economic pressure can turn into an open revolt.
The memory of the Yellow Vest protests of 2018 is central. Few other events have shaken the French elite so much. The movement initially originated from a relatively moderate increase in fuel tax. But within a few weeks, it transformed into a nationwide wave of protests against the loss of purchasing power, social inequality, and Emmanuel Macron’s technocratic leadership, perceived as arrogant.
Since then, a strategic dogma has been established at the Élysée: energy prices are no longer a purely economic issue. They are a matter of internal stability.
Precisely for this reason, Lecornu rejects a general reduction of the fuel tax. Such measures would be popular in the short term but fiscally uncontrollable in the long term. Instead, the government is betting on specific compensations for particularly exposed groups: daily commuters, healthcare workers, farmers, taxi companies, or logistics.
This is politically very revealing. The French state no longer tries to fully cushion crises. Rather, it tries to limit their social disruptive potential.
France discovers the logic of crisis economics
This shows a deeper shift in the French state philosophy.
For decades, the French social model was based on an implicit promise: the state protects the population from the rigors of global markets. Whether financial crisis, pandemic or energy price shock — Paris traditionally reacted with massive interventions, price caps, subsidies or state borrowing.
During the energy crisis following the Russian attack on Ukraine, this logic reached its provisional peak. France administratively limited electricity and gas prices and absorbed billions of euros in costs through the state budget. Public debt continued to rise; it now exceeds 110% of gross domestic product by a wide margin.
But margins are shrinking. The combination of high interest rates, weak growth, increased defense spending and structural deficits increasingly forces Paris to set priorities. The government can no longer fully neutralize every crisis.
That is why a new form of French crisis policy is now emerging: selective relief instead of universal protection.
This development is by no means limited to France. A similar trend can be observed throughout Europe. States try to manage permanent burdens rather than fully compensate them. But in France, this strategy carries a special political weight because social expectations of the state are traditionally higher than in many other European countries.
Geopolitical realism returns
Also notable is the new frankness with which French government representatives address geopolitical risks.
Just a few years ago, the dominant idea in Europe was that global economic interconnection acted as a stabilizer. Energy was considered a market issue and not a geopolitical vulnerability. Since the war in Ukraine, that assumption is collapsing.
Now, the conflict in the Middle East again exacerbates uncertainty. France thus indirectly signals to its population: the era of calculable globalization has ended.
Lecornu’s statements fit into a larger strategic pattern. Europe is mentally preparing for a world in which supply chains will be more fragile, energy will remain expensive, and geopolitical shocks will be more frequent.
There is a second factor: rearmament in terms of security. France plans massive investments in defense, weapons production, and strategic infrastructure. President Macron has spoken for years about Europe’s “strategic autonomy.” This approach receives additional legitimacy with the current crises.
But rearmament, energy security, and industrial resilience cost money. Lots of money. The political challenge is therefore to make this transformation socially acceptable.
The psychology of adaptation
This is where Lecornu’s phrase unfolds its true function.
The government tries to walk a fine line: it must prepare the population for tougher times without creating alarmism. It must convey seriousness without causing panic. And it must explain why the State will no longer be able to fully compensate for all burdens.
This explains the noticeably technocratic tone of the government communication. The crisis is not dramatized, it is managed. There is talk of specific aid, distribution of burdens, resilience, and adaptation.
There is a quiet pedagogical message in this: citizens must learn to accept uncertainty as a normal condition.
It is politically risky, because France remains a country with a strong culture of protests and a deep distrust of elites. Any perception of social injustice can quickly become explosive. At the same time, the government seems convinced that a return to the old illusion of stability is no longer possible.
That is why the real message is not: “The State protects you from the crisis.”
But: the State tries to keep society controllable throughout an era of permanent crises.
This is a fundamental difference — and possibly the true political epoch change of this moment.
P.T.