The sentence seems casual, almost folksy. “Il ne faut pas emmerder les Français” – one must not burden the French. This was said by Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu during the presentation of new aid against rising energy prices as a result of the escalation in the Middle East. But precisely in its demonstrative simplicity, this sentence reveals a remarkable political change in France.
Because Paris is visibly no longer preparing the population for a temporary crisis, but for a permanent state of emergency.
The French government now speaks with a sobriety about geopolitical risks that would have been unusual just a few years ago. Lecornu openly declared that the conflict in the Middle East “will continue in one form or another.” Even under favorable circumstances, some stabilization of the situation is not expected until autumn. At the same time, the government warns of scenarios that so far have mostly been discussed in security policy think tanks: attacks on oil infrastructure, interruptions of maritime trade routes, possible blockades of the Strait of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab.
This fundamentally shifts the political tone in France. The government is no longer trying to rhetorically conceal uncertainty. It is increasingly integrating it into official state communication.
The new language of the permanent crisis
The true meaning of Lecornu’s sentence therefore lies less in the content than in the political undertone.
“Don’t irritate the French” in this context means not only social consideration. It is the implicit acknowledgment of a political vulnerability: the French state knows how quickly economic pressure can turn into open rebellion.
The memory of the yellow vest protests of 2018 is central to this. Hardly any other event shocked the French elite as much. The movement was originally caused by a relatively limited increase in fuel tax. But within a few weeks, it developed into a national wave of protests against loss of purchasing power, social inequality, and the technocratic leadership of Emmanuel Macron, perceived as arrogant.
Since then, a strategic dogma has settled in the Élysée: energy prices are no longer purely an economic issue. They are a matter of domestic stability.
Precisely for this reason, Lecornu refuses a general reduction of the fuel tax. Such measures would be popular in the short term but fiscally difficult to control in the long term. Instead, the government focuses on targeted compensation for particularly vulnerable groups: commuters, healthcare workers, farmers, taxi companies, and logistics enterprises.
This is very politically revealing. The French state no longer tries to fully absorb crises. It mainly tries to limit societal disruptive potential.
France discovers the logic of crisis economy
A deeper shift in French state philosophy is revealed in this.
For years, the French social model was based on an implicit promise: the state extensively protects the population against the hardships of the global markets. Whether it was a financial crisis, pandemic, or energy price shock – Paris traditionally responded with massive interventions, price caps, subsidies, or state loans.
During the energy crisis after the Russian attack on Ukraine, this logic reached its peak for the time being. France administratively fixed electricity and gas prices and absorbed billions in costs through the state budget. The national debt continued to rise and is now clearly above 110 percent of gross domestic product.
But the room to maneuver is shrinking. The combination of high interest rates, weak growth, rising defense expenditures, and structural deficits forces Paris to increasingly prioritize. The government can no longer fully neutralize every crisis.
That is why a new form of French crisis policy is now emerging: selective relief instead of universal coverage.
This development is by no means limited to France. Across Europe, a similar trend can be observed. States try to administratively manage permanent burdens, rather than fully compensate for them. But in France, this strategy holds a particular political sensitivity, because social expectations towards the state are traditionally higher than in many other European countries.
Geopolitical realism returns
It is also remarkable the new openness with which French government representatives name geopolitical risks.
Until a few years ago, the dominant view in Europe was that global economic interconnection ultimately works to stabilize. Energy was primarily seen as a market issue, not as a geopolitical vulnerability. Since the war in Ukraine, this assumption has fallen apart.
Now the conflict in the Middle East is once again intensifying uncertainty. France thereby indirectly sends a signal to its own population: the phase of predictable globalization is over.
Lecornu’s statements therefore fit into a larger strategic pattern. Europe is mentally preparing for a world in which supply chains become more fragile, energy remains expensive, and geopolitical shocks occur more frequently.
There is a second factor: security-related rearmament. France is planning huge investments in defense, weapon production, and strategic infrastructure. President Macron has spoken for years about the “strategic autonomy” of Europe. This approach gains additional legitimacy from current crises.
But rearmament, energy security, and industrial resilience cost money. A lot of money. The political challenge is therefore to make this transformation socially acceptable.
The psychology of adaptation
This is precisely where Lecornu’s sentence obtains its actual function.
The government is trying to walk a narrow path: it must prepare the population for tougher times without causing alarmism. It must convey seriousness without sowing panic. And it must explain why the state cannot fully compensate every burden in the future.
This explains the strikingly technocratic tone in the government’s communication. The crisis is not exaggerated, but controlled. There is talk of targeted assistance, burden sharing, resilience, and adaptation.
There is a quiet pedagogical message in this: citizens must learn to accept uncertainty as normal.
That is politically risky. Because France remains a country with a strong protest culture and deep mistrust of elites. Every observation of social inequality can quickly become explosive. At the same time, the government seems convinced that a return to the old illusion of stability is no longer possible.
The real message is therefore not: “The state protects you from the crisis.”
But: the state tries to keep society governable through an era of permanent crises.
That is a fundamental difference — and perhaps the real political turning point of this moment.
P.T.