July 26: Power Needs Consent

July 26 recalls two political decisions that at first glance seem to have little in common: in Paris, King Charles X curtails press freedom in 1830; in Alexandria, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Yet both days revolve around the same stark question: Who has the legitimacy to control a country, its information and its strategic lifelines?

On Monday, July 26, 1830, Charles X’s July Ordinances are published in France. The Bourbon king invokes Article 14 of the Charter of 1814 and seeks to restrain a political majority hostile to him. Four ordinances suspend press freedom, dissolve the newly elected Chamber of Deputies, tighten voting rights in favor of the wealthy and call new elections.

Put plainly, it was a political kick at the door.

Charles X’s government under Jules de Polignac wanted to reassert monarchical authority. But France in 1830 had long ceased to be a country in which a king could govern past the public without resistance. Poor harvests, rising food prices and social unrest had already poisoned the atmosphere. In the elections of June and July, liberal opponents of the court had made gains. The ordinances therefore struck a society that no longer allowed itself to be treated like a silent spectator in political affairs.

Journalists reacted especially quickly. In the editorial offices of the newspaper Le National, Adolphe Thiers and his colleagues drafted a protest against the breach of the constitutional order. Forty-four journalists signed it. Printers, typesetters and publishers suddenly faced an existential choice: obey or keep printing. The press was not yet a glass smartphone in every pocket, but it already possessed enormous explosive force.

The following day, Paris tipped into revolt. From July 27 to 29, residents erected barricades, fought royal troops and won parts of the military to their side. These three days went down in history as the Trois Glorieuses. Charles X abdicated on August 2; on August 9, Louis-Philippe of Orléans ascended the throne as “King of the French.” The new formula itself revealed the change: the ruler was to derive his position more strongly from the nation, rather than from a sacralized claim of ownership over France.

The Revolution of 1830 did not bring democracy in the modern sense. Voting rights remained tied to property and tax payments, women remained entirely excluded, and social conflicts by no means disappeared. Yet it established a clear limit: even a constitutional monarchy could not simply cast aside the press and the elected representation at will. France’s later republican culture also draws on such experiences, in which printed pages carried more weight than royal seals.

Exactly 126 years later, on July 26, 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in Alexandria. The canal connected the Mediterranean and Red Seas, drastically shortened the route between Europe and Asia, and was of the utmost importance for trade, oil supplies and military strategy. The company was under British-French influence; France and Britain saw their economic interests and international standing under threat.

Nasser linked the move to the construction of the Aswan High Dam, for which Western lenders had withdrawn their support. Revenue from the canal was intended to finance the project. For many Egyptians, nationalization represented more than an economic measure: it meant asserting the right to decide for themselves over infrastructure on their own soil. After decades of European dominance, it sounded like a national reclamation.

France, however, also viewed Nasser through the lens of the Algerian War. Egypt’s leadership supported North African nationalists through propaganda, training and arms trading. In Paris, Nasser was therefore regarded as a regional adversary, not merely as the operator of a canal. The crisis led in the autumn of 1956 to secret agreements between France and Britain with Israel in Sevres near Paris. Israel attacked the Sinai Peninsula on October 29; France and Britain then issued an ultimatum and landed their own troops in the canal zone.

The military operation quickly became a diplomatic failure. The United States did not support the attack by its European allies, the Soviet Union in turn threatened to intervene, and the United Nations pressed for a ceasefire. London and Paris accepted it on November 6. The intervention brutally demonstrated that the old European colonial powers could no longer wield their power according to their own rules.

What use is strategic strength if it lacks political consent?

It is in this question that Paris in 1830 and Suez in 1956 meet. Charles X possessed state power, but his actions destroyed the already fragile recognition of his rule. France and Britain possessed armies and a carefully developed plan in 1956, but their actions disregarded Egyptian sovereignty and isolated them internationally. In both cases, the attempt to force political reality into shape by decree or military action failed.

The present has different instruments, but the same temptation. When faced with criticism, governments are quickly tempted to put pressure on the media, alter electoral rules for tactical purposes or treat central trade routes as leverage. The Suez Canal in particular remains important to global supply chains; disruptions there raise transport costs, lengthen routes and ultimately affect European consumers as well. History rarely lies dusty in the archives – sometimes it sails right through global trade.

July 26 offers no convenient moral. Press freedom does not shield any government from criticism, and national control does not guarantee political success. But both events mark a boundary: lasting order requires law, consent and resilient international rules. Charles X lost his throne in 1830; after Suez, the canal remained under Egyptian control.