The power struggle over the so-called „socle commun“ — the shared political foundation of the center and the moderate right — is now officially under way. With Gabriel Attal positioned as Renaissance’s preferred candidate for the 2027 presidential election, French politics is entering a phase of permanent primary-style campaigning. Three men are now trying to embody the same political promise: to prevent another final showdown between the Rassemblement National and the radical left.
The problem is this: Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe and Bruno Retailleau largely appeal to the same electorate, yet they pursue fundamentally different strategies.
For months Édouard Philippe has been working to establish a classic presidential posture: statesmanlike distance, sparing public appearances, international seriousness and the image of political stability. He wants to appear as the man who can restore calm and order after the years of Macronist fragmentation.
Gabriel Attal, by contrast, pursues exactly the opposite strategy. Constant media presence, permanent travels across the country, offensive interventions and markedly more nervous political rhetoric: the former Prime Minister is betting on tempo, visibility and a generational embodiment of a new political style.
Bruno Retailleau, for his part, is trying to rebuild an authority-oriented right that aims to win back conservative voters who are increasingly sympathetic to Jordan Bardella, without, however, defecting directly to the Rassemblement National.
Behind this personal rivalry, however, lies a much more fundamental question: does this famous „socle commun“ even still exist?
This alliance emerged from the gradual rapprochement between the political center of Macronism and parts of the Republican right after the crisis years of 2024. Originally this camp mainly appeared as a pragmatic governing coalition to secure parliamentary majorities. Today it increasingly feels like a political space without a clear ideological axis.
The paradox is obvious. All parties publicly emphasize the need for unity and warn against a fragmentation of the moderate camp. At the same time, however, each of them is already building its own presidential machine. Debates about possible open primaries make this contradiction particularly visible: no one actually seems ready to stand down for a rival.
Gabriel Attal does bring qualities that some of his opponents lack. At 37 he masters the modern mechanisms of political communication almost perfectly. He still has high visibility and mobilizing power, especially among urban and academically oriented voter groups.
But that is also his weakness. His political identity remains closely tied to the outgoing Macronism — and with it to a political phase that many French people now associate with institutional instability, reform fatigue and an erosion of authority.
Édouard Philippe, by contrast, benefits from a markedly more presidential image in the polls. His restrained strategy, however, also carries risks. Political caution can quickly be perceived in an increasingly polarized public as mere opportunism or political passivity.
Bruno Retailleau, meanwhile, has succeeded in building a stable, militant base within the Republicans with his clearly right-conservative line. At the same time, that very ideological sharpness makes it harder for him to appeal to voters in the political center and to form a broader alliance.
The real challenge for this centrist and conservative camp may lie elsewhere. While the moderate forces lose themselves in internal rivalries, Jordan Bardella and the political extremes benefit from much clearer political legibility. An increasing part of public opinion now seems to prefer simple, clearly identifiable political lines to large, ideologically blurred coalitions.
The 2027 presidential election could therefore become less a confrontation over programs than a competition over political embodiment and leadership style. And it is precisely in this contest that the „socle commun“ risks losing its real political center.
Author: P. Tiko